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ABSTRACT
This article critiques the sexual harassment provisions of Hong Kong's Sex Discri-
mination Ordinance, as well as the enforcement model. Although the judiciary has
had some opportunity to interpret the Ordinance, most complaints never reach the
courts because the Equal Opportunities Commission has a statutory duty to
attempt to conciliate a complaint before granting legal assistance. When the
Ordinance was enacted it was widely assumed that Chinese women would prefer
confidential conciliation to a public hearing. However, interviews with past
complainants and representatives of women's organizations reveal that many com-
plainants find conciliation conferences to be extremely stressful. They also feel
demeaned and disempowered by what is effectively an obligation to negotiate
with the respondent. The author concludes that the current model exacerbates
the power imbalance between complainants and respondents and limits the
systemic impact of the law. She argues that an informal and inexpensive Equal
Opportunities Tribunal should be created. This would allow those complainants
who are willing to try their complaints to proceed directly to a hearing, without
any obligation to first participate in conciliation.
INTRODUCTION
This article critiques Hong Kong's law of sexual harassment and its
enforcement model, which encourages conciliation of complaints. In
addition to the statutory provisions and a small number of litigated
cases, the article also draws upon a random sample of complaints
filed with the Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission and
interviews with individuals who have participated in the conciliation
process at he Commission. Sexual harassment now represents the
second largest category of complaints filed under the Sex Discrimina-
tion Ordinance' and the sexual harassment complaints in our sample
had a reasonably high rate of conciliation (nearly 55%). Nonetheless,
interviews with a selection of past complainants and women's orga-
nizations reveal significant dissatisfaction with the current model.
They report that complainants often resent being asked to negotiate
with their harasser, feel powerless during the conciliation conference,
and are disappointed to find that there is no judgment at the end of
the process. These results are surprising since it was widely assumed,
when the legislation was enacted, that Hong Kong women would
prefer conciliation to a hearing.
The second part of the article briefly reviews the legislative history
of Hong Kong's Sex Discrimination Ordinance2 and the enforcement
model. The third part considers the scope of the sexual harassment
provisions, including the areas in which sexual harassment is prohib-
ited, vicarious liability of employers, and liability for victimization.
The fourth part analyses the definition of sexual harassment under
the Ordinance, which is somewhat different for harassment in the
workplace than for harassment in other areas. The fifth part discusses
the case of Yuen Sha Sha v. Tse Chi Pan,3 in which a university student
was held liable for sexual harassment after he secretly videotaped
another student as she undressed. This was the first sexual harassment
case to be tried in Hong Kong and established an important precedent.
Indeed, it is one of the few reported cases, in any jurisdiction, based
entirely upon an invasion of the victim's privacy. The sixth part dis-
cusses remedies for sexual harassment, including compensatory
damages, exemplary damages, and orders to apologize, the legality
of which has been upheld by Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal,
albeit only in rare cases. The seventh part analyses the use of concilia-
tion and the role of the Equal Opportunities Commission in sexual
harassment complaints. This section relies upon a random sample of
complaint files and interviews with staff at the Commission, past com-
plainants, representatives of women's support groups, and others who
have participated in the complaints process. I conclude that the exist-
ing model leaves too much power in the hands of respondents and
limits the systemic impact of the law. I suggest that an informal
equal opportunities tribunal be established for those complainants
who are willing to take their complaints to a hearing.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND HONG KONG'S ENFORCEMENT
MODEL
Prior to 1991, the concept of equality was almost entirely absent
from Hong Kong's legal system.4 The British government ratified
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) in 1986. However, it departed from its
normal practice of extending human rights treaties to its dependent
territories and chose not to extend CEDAW to Hong Kong.5 This
decision was apparently made at the request of the Hong Kong
government, which maintained many discriminatory laws and
policies at that time. Certain other international human rights
conventions that applied to Hong Kong included the right to equal-
ity but they were not enforceable as domestic law in the Hong Kong
courts. As a result, sex discrimination was openly practised and
accepted as the norm. For example, women were legally barred
from inheriting much of the land in the New Territories part of
Hong Kong and virtually every newspaper contained sex-specific
job advertisements.6 Women's organizations regularly lobbied for
law reform. However, the legislative process was largely controlled
by the government and the business community, which firmly
opposed anti-discrimination laws.
Fortunately, in the transition period leading to 1997, Hong
Kong underwent significant legal and political developments.7 In
late 1989 (as part of its efforts to rebuild public confidence after
the Beijing massacre), the Hong Kong government proposed a Bill
of Rights for Hong Kong. Enacted in 1991, the Bill of Rights Ordi-
nance was the first domestic law to recognise a right to gender equal-
ity and women's organizations used its enactment to publicise gender
issues and educate legislators. This was significant as the government
was also introducing limited democracy reforms and the legislature
was becoming more accountable to the public. Several legislators
became strong supporters of the equality movement. Pressure from
these legislators ultimately compelled the government to conduct
its first public consultation on sex discrimination, which revealed
widespread public support for the enactment of sex discrimination
legislation and the extension of CEDAW to Hong Kong.
One legislator, Ms Anna Wu, put further pressure on the
government by drafting her own Equal Opportunities Bill 8 which
sought to prohibit discrimination on a wide range of grounds
(including sex, disability, sexuality, race, and age), as well as sexual
harassment. Initially the government ignored her bill, dismissing it
as too radical to be taken seriously. However, in early 1994 Wu dis-
tributed her draft bill for public comment and a significant number of
fellow legislators pledged to support it. In July 1994 she formally
introduced her bill into the Legislative Council and a Bills Commit-
tee began to study it. At this point the government realised that it had
little choice but to abandon its opposition to the concept of anti-
discrimination legislation. The legislature was due to become fully
elected in 1995 and even pro-business legislators would thus find it
difficult to oppose Wu's bill, unless they could be presented with a
more conservative alternative. The government thus reluctantly
announced that it would soon introduce its own Sex Discrimination
Bill and Disability Discrimination Bill. These two areas of discrimi-
nation had attracted the most public concern and the government
hoped that by promising to legislate against them it could prevent
Wu's broader bill from being enacted.
At first, there was some dispute about whether the government's
Sex Discrimination Bill would expressly prohibit sexual harassment.
The Secretary for Home Affairs initially announced that it would not
do so. He probably assumed this because he knew that the govern-
ment planned largely to copy the UK Sex Discrimination Act 1975
(which, as originally enacted, did not expressly address sexual
harassment although it was interpreted by the courts to prohibit it
where it constitutes unlawful discrimination).9 However, women's
organizations reacted very negatively to this announcement and
the government subsequently confirmed that it would add provisions
expressly defining and prohibiting sexual harassment, which it
borrowed from the Australian federal Sex Discrimination Act 1984
(as amended in 1992)."
Although the government's bill was narrower and more
conservative than Wu's Equal Opportunities Bill, most women's
organizations (and ultimately Wu herself) supported it, largely
because the government had the constitutional power to create an
Equal Opportunities Commission.1' However, Wu and women's
organizations proposed numerous amendments to strengthen the
government's bill. One of these amendments expanded the definition
of sexual harassment in employment-related cases and is discussed
below. 12
When the various discrimination bills were being considered by
the legislature there was substantial debate on the enforcement
model that should be adopted. From the start, it was suggested
that a model that emphasised conciliation would be appropriate
for Hong Kong's cultural and economic context. Indeed, one
labour expert suggested that Hong Kong should follow the example
of Japan, where the employment discrimination legislation initially
lacked any effective enforcement mechanism and relied instead
upon persuasion. He argued that:
"[The Japanese] Act has won approval as a vehicle of 'gradualistic'
reform for being able to signal to the public, especially the business
community, the moral importance of vindicating the rights of
women at the workplace, while remaining prudent enough to recog-
nise traditionally enshrined customs and practice, both in family
and society. In Hong Kong, there is no reason why similar prudence
at the normative level should not be exhibited, given our Confucian
heritage. While the present enthusiasm for human rights should not
stop at the factory gate, it is equally important that the assiduous
propagation of these standards and values should not undermine or
attempt to supplant Chinese family values and traditions among
those for whom they are a cherished legacy."'
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There is no question that Hong Kong employers would have
supported this approach. However, women's organizations were
aware of the limited impact of the Japanese law and they had already
expressed their opposition to a similar proposal based upon persua-
sion (which had been raised by the government in the 1993 Green
Paper on Equal Opportunities /or Men and Women).14 The women's
movement had also gained considerable support in the legislature.
Thus, by the 1994-95 legislative session, the Hong Kong government
knew that it had to propose something stronger than moral persua-
sion if it was to serve as a viable alternative to Anna Wu's Bill. It
therefore agreed that the Sex Discrimination Bill and Disability
Discrimination Bill would be enforceable in the courts, with investi-
gation and conciliation services provided by an Equal Opportunities
Commission. However, the government declined to create a special-
ist equal opportunities tribunal, which had been an element of Anna
Wu's proposals. 
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The result was a compromise model, but one that has the effect
of discouraging litigation. Victims of discrimination and harassment
may, if they wish, file a complaint directly in the District Court.
However, most victims of discrimination cannot afford to do so, as
Hong Kong has notoriously high legal fees and contingency fee
arrangements are not permitted. Instead, most complainants rely
entirely upon the free assistance provided by the Commission. The
legislation obligates the Commission to investigate and 'endeavour
to conciliate' all complaints filed with it (except for those that lack
substance or can be discontinued on other grounds provided by
the statute). Thus, although there is no statutory requirement that
a victim of sexual harassment attempt to conciliate her complaint,
in practice she is compelled to participate in conciliation as long as
the respondent is willing to do so. If the complainant refuses to
participate (or rejects what the Commission believes is a reasonable
offer), it is unlikely that the Commission will later grant her assis-
tance to litigate.
The next two sections consider the scope of liability and the
definition of sexual harassment under Hong Kong law.
THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The Protected Spheres
Like most jurisdictions, Hong Kong only prohibits sexual harass-
ment in certain protected spheres, which are defined in sections 23,
24, 39, and 40 of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. Section 23
addresses harassment in the workplace and is drafted quite broadly.
It protects employees, employers, applicants for jobs, contract
workers and commission agents. It is also unlawful for a partner in
a firm to harass another partner or someone seeking to become a
partner (section 23(6)). The Ordinance expressly applies to persons
who are proposing to form a partnership, as well as to existing
firms (section 23(7)).
Section 23 also provides a special provision for domestic
helpers. There are a large number of foreign domestic helpers in
Hong Kong and they are particularly vulnerable to sexual harass-
ment, as they generally live with their employers and risk deportation
if they are fired. The standard provisions prohibiting sexual harass-
ment by an employer or co-worker would not provide adequate
protection, as the 'employer' of a domestic helper is the person
who signs her contract, whereas she may be sexually harassed by
others who reside in the household (such as the husband or the son
of the employer). Section 23(12) thus provides that it is unlawful
for 'any person who resides on the premises' to harass a domestic
helper who works there. Of course, in practice, it is difficult for a
foreign domestic helper to file a complaint of sexual harassment, as
she would almost certainly have to leave her employer's residence
and would find it difficult to remain in Hong Kong to pursue
her claim. Nonetheless, some domestic helpers have filed sexual
harassment complaints with the Commission, as well as criminal
complaints.
Section 24 extends the prohibition on sexual harassment o four
additional areas that are related to work. It applies to: trade unions
(it is unlawful for a member to sexually harass another member or
someone seeking to become a member); qualifying bodies (it is
unlawful for a member of a qualifying body, such as the Law Society,
to sexually harass a person who is seeking an authorization or
qualification); and providers of employment-related training. It is
also unlawful for a person who operates or works for an employment
agency to sexually harass a person in the course of providing or
offering to provide the agency's services.
Apart from employment, education is probably the sphere in
which women are most likely to experience sexual harassment.
Section 39 protects students and potential students from harassment,
not only by staff but also by other students. (The first sexual harass-
ment case to be tried in Hong Kong, discussed below, concerned
student-to-student sexual harassment, a problem which has received
significant public attention in recent years.) Teaching staff are also
protected from harassment by students and potential students. (If
a member of staff is harassed by a co-worker, that would fall
within section 23, harassment in employment.)
Section 40 defines the remainder of the 'protected spheres'
(those that do not fall within the areas of work or education). It
applies to the provision of goods, facilities and services, a broad
category which would include the provision of medical care, legal
services, sports facilities, retail goods, and transportation. Section
40 also makes it unlawful for a person who manages premises to
sexually harass a person in the course of managing, providing, or
offering to provide premises to her. Finally, section 40 includes a
special provision for barristers because a barrister works as a solo
practitioner and is not in an employment or partnership relationship
with other members of chambers. Section 40(6)-(7) makes it unlaw-
ful for a barrister or barrister's clerk to sexually harass a barrister or
pupil in chambers or to sexually harass a person in the course of
offering to provide pupillage or tenancy in chambers. It is also unlaw-
ful for any person to sexually harass a barrister in the course of giving
or withholding instructions.
Harassment of Men and 'Same-Sex' Harassment
Although I have tried to summarize sections 23, 24, 39, and 40 in
gender-neutral language, the statute actually uses the phrase 'it is
unlawful for a person... to sexually harass a woman', making no
reference to sexual harassment of men. Similarly, the definition of
sexual harassment (discussed below) refers to sexual harassment
against a woman. However, tucked away in the interpretation
clause is section 2(8), which states that: '[a] provision of Part III or
IV framed with reference to sexual harassment of women shall be
treated as applying equally to the treatment of men' and that the
relevant provisions must be interpreted by the court 'with such
modifications as are necessary'. Women's organizations did ask the
government to use gender-neutral language throughout the Ordi-
nance but the government refused to do so. The government's
approach has created some unnecessary confusion, as section 2(8)
has no heading in the table of contents and can easily be missed by
a lay person.
The Ordinance does not expressly state whether 'same-sex
harassment' (female-to-female or male-to-male) is prohibited. How-
ever, in my view, it is clearly covered by the law. Sections 23, 24, 39
and 40 do not state that it is unlawful for a man to sexually harass a
woman, but rather that it is unlawful for a person to sexually harass a
woman. The explicit use of the gender-neutral term 'person'
expresses a clear intention to include sexual harassment of a
woman by another woman. And, in a case in which a man alleged
sexual harassment by another man, the judge would be required by
section 2(8) (discussed above) to give a similarly broad interpretation
of the law when it is applied to male complainants. The definition of
sexual harassment (discussed below) does not require that the alleged
harasser acted out of sexual desire. It follows that a claim of 'same-
sex' sexual harassment would not necessarily be limited to cases in
which the harasser was gay or lesbian. It could also extend to situa-
tions in which homophobic co-workers repeatedly taunt a gay
employee with lewd comments about his sexual life. 6 Thus, although
there is still no law in Hong Kong prohibiting sexuality dis-
crimination,' 7 the law of sexual harassment could be used to prohibit
certain types of sexuality harassment.
Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment
Section 46(1) of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance states that
'[a]nything done by a person in the course of his employment shall
be treated for the purposes of this Ordinance as done by his employer
as well as by him, whether or not it was done with the employer's
knowledge or approval.' Thus the Ordinance imposes vicarious
liability on the employer for unlawful acts done by employees in
the course of their employment.'" (Principals are also vicariously
liable for unlawful acts of agents done with authority.) However,
the employer can raise the defence that it took 'such steps as were
reasonably practicable' to prevent his employee or agent from com-
mitting the unlawful act. The burden of proof will be on the employer
to establish this defence.
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The Sex Discrimination Ordinance Code of Practice on
Employment provides (at paragraph 20) quite detailed recommenda-
tions on what employers should do to prevent and address harass-
ment. For example, it provides that employers should establish a
clear policy against sexual harassment, including examples of the
kind of conduct that must be avoided. The employer should then
actively promote the policy, through notices, staff meetings, and
training courses. The employer should also designate a co-ordinator
(preferably one who is sensitive and trained in the field) to receive
complaints. The complaints procedures must assure potential victims
that they will not suffer any retaliation if they make complaints.
Although the Code of Practice does not have the same status as
the Ordinance (and does not create any additional legal duties) it
may be admissible in evidence and taken into account by the court
if it is relevant to a question.20 Clearly, a court could consider the
fact that an employer failed to follow the Code (which has now
been well publicized by the Equal Opportunities Commission) as
relevant to the question of whether the employer had taken reason-
able steps to prevent unlawful acts by employees.
A case litigated in 2000 demonstrates how an employer can
protect itself from vicarious liability if it adopts and enforces a
policy against sexual harassment. A male former employee of IBM
(HK) Ltd. ('IBM') alleged that he had been sexually harassed by a
female project manager and dismissed by the company after he com-
plained about the harassment. The female project manager admitted
that she and the plaintiff had had a personal relationship but testified
that it was consensual and that she had no influence over his career
(as she occupied a lower rank than the plaintiff in the management
hierarchy). The case largely turned on the facts, as the Judge found
the plaintiff to be an unreliable witness, rejected most of his evidence,
and decided that the sexual advances of his co-worker were not
unwelcome. However, the Judge also found that even if the plaintiff
had been successful against his co-worker, IBM would not have been
vicariously liable for her acts because it had taken reasonable steps to
prevent sexual harassment and thus could establish the affirmative
defense in section 46(3) of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance.
In particular, the Judge noted that IBM provided guidelines on
sexual harassment and required employees to sign a certificate
declaring that they had read and understood them. A supervisor
had also lectured the plaintiff about an email he had sent to the
first defendant (in which he had referred to her as 'Tamara Baby')
that might have been interpreted as violating the policy. The Judge
thus found that IBM's managers had demonstrated that they were
,ready and prepared to implement the guidelines, [and] that they
were cautious in dealing with any conduct which might have a
sexual harassment related overtone, in order to demonstrate their
zero tolerance' of sexual harassment.2 1 The Judge's decision should
encourage Hong Kong employers to adopt and enforce policies
against sexual harassment. Although such policies obviously
cannot prevent personal relationships among employees, they may
protect the employer from vicarious liability in the event that such
a relationship leads to a complaint of sexual harassment.
While there would appear to be no public policy impediment
under Hong Kong law to insuring against liability for sexual harass-
ment, no companies appear to be underwriting it. This may be
because of the newness of sexual harassment legislation and also
because damages awards have so far been so low that insurance is
not generally considered to be necessary.
Victimization of Complainants
Section 9 of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance prohibits discrimina-
tion by way of victimizing a person who has sought to enforce the
Ordinance or has alleged that an act that would be unlawful under
the Ordinance has been committed. Section 9 also protects anyone
who gives evidence or information in connection with proceedings
under the Ordinance. There is a very real risk that a person who
files or substantiates a complaint of sexual harassment will be
victimized in some way, either by the alleged harasser or by co-
workers. Obviously, firing the complainant would constitute less
favourable treatment. Other examples would include transferring
her to a less desirable position; denying her a promotion or raise to
which she would otherwise have been entitled; subjecting her to
undue criticism; giving her an unusually heavy workload; or putting
negative comments on her personal file. A recent Hong Kong case
against an international company (brought by a woman whose
underlying complaint was for pregnancy discrimination) demonstrates
that even large organizations with sophisticated human resource
policies can make the mistake of victimizing a complainant.22 A com-
plaint for victimization can be successful even though the underlying
complaint for sexual harassment was not successful. However, the
duty not to discriminate against a person who makes an allegation
does not apply if the allegation turns out to be 'false and not made
in good faith'.23
The vicarious liability provision discussed above (section 46)
applies equally to discrimination by way of victimization. Thus,
the employer must not only refrain from discriminating against the
complainant, but must also prevent the alleged harasser (or other
co-workers) from retaliating against her. In practice, this may be
quite difficult. However if the employer can demonstrate that it
took reasonable steps to protect her (for example, by directing the
alleged harasser not to retaliate, giving the victim the opportunity
to work with other people, and encouraging the victim to report
any acts of retaliation), the employer may be able to successfully
assert the defence to vicarious liability provided in section 46(3).
In the recent case against IBM (discussed above), the plaintiff
alleged victimization, claiming that he was fired after he made the
complaint of sexual harassment against his co-worker. However,
the Judge accepted the testimony of IBM's witnesses, which was
that the plaintiff was terminated for reasons unrelated to his
complaint of sexual harassment, including unauthorised purchases,
difficulties working with others, and a record of poor performance
reviews.The Judge's summary of the testimony indicates that there
was ample evidence to support this finding.
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However, the Judge also found that the plaintiff could not
possibly have been dismissed as a result of his allegation of sexual
harassment because the plaintiff did not make any complaint until
his exit interview.2 5 In my view, this particular finding reflects an
overly technical view of what it means to 'complain' about sexual
harassment. Although the Judge rejected most of the testimony of
the plaintiff, even the testimony of the IBM witness indicates that the
plaintiff had made an allegation before his dismissal that could
amount to sexual harassment if substantiated. The Judge summar-
ized the testimony of the IBM supervisor (who later made the
decision to dismiss the plaintiff) as follows:
"On 25th November [the IBM supervisor] received an email from D I
complaining about the plaintiff's P's uncooperative work attitude. He
spoke to the plaintiff, who in turn showed him some emails between
him and DI which he thought were of a personal nature and that
they were having an affair of some sort. The plaintiff also remarked
[that] he thought that Dl was out to get him. [The supervisor] met
up with the plaintiff after work ... and he said that the plaintiff
confided in him that he had an affair with DI but he wanted to
break it off because his girlfriend had found out about it. [The super-
visor] suggested it would be best for the plaintiff to sign off from the
CPA project to avoid interaction with D1 and the plaintiff chose to
write a note to inform other team members of his change in
responsibility."
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The supervisor also admitted that after this meeting (but prior to
the plaintiff's dismissal) the plaintiff had shown him further emails
that he had received from D1, but testified that 'he [the supervisor]
thought it was just their own personal matters which they would
have to sort out themselves.'27 A few weeks later, this same super-
visor dismissed the plaintiff, at which point the plaintiff blamed his
poor performance on sexual harassment. The position taken by
IBM was that this exit interview was the first time that the plaintiff
had complained of sexual harassment a position that the Judge
expressly accepted in her findings. In my view, this part of the
judgement is questionable. Although the plaintiff apparently did
not use the words 'sexual harassment' in his November meeting
with the supervisor, it appears that he did express the view that Ms
Russ was 'out to get him' because he wanted to end their affair. If
his claim were true, it might well constitute unlawful sexual harass-
ment even if the affair had initially been consensual. It should be
noted that section 9 of the Ordinance (which prohibits discrimination
by way of victimization) does not simply protect people who make
formal complaints of unlawful acts. It also expressly protects
anyone who alleges acts that could 'amount to a contravention' of
the Ordinance. Thus, in my view, it was incorrect for the Judge to
conclude that the plaintiff never made an allegation prior to his
exit interview that could fall within the scope of section 9. It
would have been better if the Judge had relied entirely on her finding
that IBM's decision to fire him was for cause and was not influenced
by the plaintiff's complaints about Ms Russ' behaviour towards
him.
THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The definition of sexual harassment is contained in section 2(5) of the
Sex Discrimination Ordinance. It provides three alternative defini-
tions of sexual harassment, two of which can be applied to any
case of sexual harassment and one which can be applied only in
the context of work-related harassment. Section 2(5)(a) (which can
be applied to any case of sexual harassment covered by the Ordi-
nance) provides two alternative definitions of harassment. It states
that:
For the purposes of this Ordinance, a person (howsoever described)
sexually harasses a woman if-
(a) the person
(i) makes an unwelcome sexual advance, or an unwelcome
request for sexual favours, to her;
or
(ii) engages in other unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in
relation to her, in circumstances in which a reasonable
person, having regard to all the circumstances, would
have anticipated that she would be offended, humiliated
or intimidated...
Section 2(7) expressly states that 'conduct of a sexual nature'
includes 'making a statement of a sexual nature to a woman, or in
her presence, whether the statement is made orally or in writing.'
Thus, telling offensive jokes to a woman or sending her offensive
pornography could constitute sexual harassment, providing that it
is unwelcome and a reasonable person would have anticipated that
it would offend her.
Section 2(5)(b) goes on to state a third, alternative definition,
which can be applied to work-related harassment (covered by
sections 23 and 24), but not to harassment falling within section 39
(education) and section 40 (other spheres).2 Section 2(5)(b) states
that a person sexually harasses a woman if 'the person, alone or
together with other persons, engages in conduct of a sexual nature
which creates a sexually hostile or intimidating work environment
for her.'
At first glance, it might appear that section 2(5)(a) is meant to
prohibit only what the literature commonly refers to as quid pro
quo harassment, since section 2(5)(b) expressly refers to hostile
work environment harassment. In fact, section 2(5)(a) is not confined
to quidpro quo harassment. This can be seen from an analysis of the
comparable Australian provision, on which section 2(5)(a) is based.
The Australian federal Sex Discrimination Act 1984 originally pro-
vided that unlawful sexual harassment only occurred where the com-
plainant either: (1) objected to the conduct and suffered a detriment
in connection with her employment; or (2) reasonably feared a
detriment if she objected to it. 29 However, in 1992, the Australian
federal Sex Discrimination Act was amended so as to remove the
'detriment' requirement. Section 28 was repealed and a new section
28A was added.30 As a result of this amendment, the Australian
federal legislation became significantly broader. Section 2(5)(a) of
the Hong Kong Sex Discrimination Ordinance (which applies to
all of the protected spheres), was copied from the amended section
28A of the Australian federal legislation and can similarly be applied
to both quid pro quo harassment and 'hostile environment' harass-
ment, provided that the plaintiff alleges facts which satisfy the
statutory definition.
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What then is the purpose of section 2(5)(b), which expressly
refers to 'hostile work environment' harassment'? The answer lies
in the legislative history of Hong Kong's Sex Discrimination
Ordinance. The Bills Committee simultaneously studied two bills,
Anna Wu's Equal Opportunities Bill and the Government's Sex
Discrimination Bill. After Wu decided to support the government's
bill, many women's organizations expressed concern about the
words 'in relation to', which appear in section 2(5)(a)(ii) of the
definition of sexual harassment. They feared that Hong Kong
courts might interpret this phrase too narrowly, so as to require
that the unwelcome sexual conduct was directed specifically at the
victim. This could be problematic in cases in which the unwelcome
conduct was not directed at a particular person, but rather was
simply a part of the general working atmosphere. For example,
sexual jokes may be told at staff meetings or obscene pictures may
be displayed in the coffee room. In such cases, the defendant might
argue that since the unwelcome conduct was not directed just at
her but rather was experienced by everyone, it was not 'in relation
to her'.
In response to these concerns, the government agreed to amend
its definition of sexual harassment so as to incorporate a portion of
the definition used in Wu's bill (which had been borrowed from the
Western Australian Equal Opportunity Act 1984). This was the
source of section 2(5)(b), which provides an additional alternative
definition of sexual harassment in employment situations. It states
that a person also sexually harasses a woman if 'the person, alone
or together with other persons, engages in conduct of a sexual
nature which creates a sexually hostile or intimidating work environ-
ment for her'. This provision does not require that the sexual conduct
be 'in relation to' the victim but can only be applied in the context of
work. Women in other spheres, such as education, may also bring an
action for 'hostile environment' harassment, but they must prove
that the conduct that created the hostile environment satisfied the
definition in section 2(5)(a), including the requirement that the
conduct was 'in relation to the victim'.
The phrase 'in relation to' has been considered by the Hong
Kong Court of Appeal in an action for judicial review of a decision
that a police officer should be compulsorily retired for violating a
Police Headquarters Order that included the same definition of
sexual harassment as section 2(5)(a) of the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance. While the police officer's application for judicial review
was successful, both the Court of First Instance and the Court of
Appeal rejected the applicant's argument that the requirement 'in
relation to' should be interpreted so as to exclude sexual comments
that were made to a woman but were not actually about her. The
Court of Appeal noted that section 2(5)(a)(ii) "covers unwelcome
conduct of a sexual nature engaged in by a person in relation to
the complainant although the conduct, as in this case a conversation,
was not 'in respect of' her but 'with her'"'.32 The Court expressly
stated that if a man tells sexual stories to a woman this could
constitute sexual conduct 'in relation to her' for the purposes of
the definition of sexual harassment.
This indicates that the Hong Kong courts are unlikely to adopt
an unduly narrow interpretation of the 'in relation to' requirement.
Thus, the scope of protection against sexual harassment in non-
employment areas may not be that much different from that
provided in the workplace. The one problematic situation could be
the general display of pornography. While this could easily be held
to constitute 'hostile environment' harassment in the workplace
(section 2(5)(b)), it is still unclear whether it would satisfy the defini-
tion in section 2(5)(a). If not, then the general display of pornogra-
phy in a non-work environment (such as a students' lounge) might
not be actionable.33 However, the Court of Appeal's decision in
Ratcliffe makes it very clear that pornographic material that is com-
municated to particular students can constitute sexual conduct 'in
relation to' them.
Indeed, such a case has already arisen in Hong Kong. In 1999,
the XX Group, a feminist student group at the University of Hong
Kong, received a series of sexually threatening emails. Explicit
pornographic material was attached to the email messages and the
final message included a death threat. Ultimately, the sender of the
emails (a first-year male student) was identified. He was convicted
of criminal intimidation and also expelled from the University for
violating its sexual harassment policy.34 The main victim also filed
a complaint of sexual harassment with the Equal Opportunities
Commission. The respondent wisely agreed to conciliate the
matter, thus avoiding the additional publicity of a civil trial. Had
the case gone to trial the court likely would have held that both
the email messages and also the pornographic material attached to
the messages were 'in relation to' the woman who received them.
The next section discusses another case of 'student-to-student'
harassment, one that did proceed to trial and established that
voyeuristic behaviour can constitute sexual harassment under
Hong Kong law.
VOYEURISM AS SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE CASE OF
YUEN SHA SHA v. TSE CHI PAN
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In March 1997, a female student at the Chinese University of Hong
Kong, accidentally discovered a camcorder hidden inside a paper
box on top of her roommate's wardrobe. The camcorder contained
a working videotape and was pointed toward the plaintiff's bed
and wardrobe, where she normally changed clothes. She also found
some books beneath the camcorder, one of which bore the name of
the defendant, the boyfriend of her roommate. The plaintiff con-
fronted the defendant, and he admitted that he had been filming
her over a period of several months. The videotape showed the plain-
tiff in various states of undress. One scene also showed the defendant
adjusting the angle of the camcorder in front of the plaintiff's
wardrobe and pointing at the lens, indicating that he had deliberately
targeted her dressing area.
Although there was very little dispute over the facts, the defen-
dant refused to conciliate the matter. At the trial the defendant did
not give evidence or call any witnesses, and on the second day of
the hearing his counsel indicated that he largely admitted liability.
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As a result, the judge apparently decided that it was not necessary to
give a detailed analysis of liability and her decision is quite brief on
this point. This is unfortunate, not only because the case was the
first complaint of sexual harassment o be tried in Hong Kong, but
also because there are very few reported decisions in any jurisdiction
on this type of sexual harassment. Thus it would have been appro-
priate to consider precisely how the defendant's actions satisfied
the statutory definition of unlawful harassment.
As the defendant did not make sexual advances to the plaintiff,
section 2(5)(a)(ii) (quoted in Part 4 above) is the relevant definition.
It can be divided into four elements: 1) unwelcome conduct; 2) of a
sexual nature; 3) in relation to the plaintiff; and 4) which is such
that a reasonable person would anticipate that the plaintiff would
be offended, humiliated or intimidated. The first and third elements
are not problematic. The filming was obviously 'unwelcome' as the
defendant filmed the plaintiff without her knowledge and did not
allege that she did anything to invite or solicit his behaviour.37 The
'in relation to' requirement was also easily satisfied, as the defendant
deliberately filmed the plaintiff. However, the other two elements -
conduct of a 'sexual nature' and the reasonable person test - require
more detailed analysis, and I would suggest the following.
Conduct of a sexual nature: The act of filming a person is not, per
se, a sexual act. In this particular case, the plaintiff testified that when
she confronted the defendant he told her that he had filmed her
because he was secretly in love with her and sexually attracted to
her.38 However, the court noted that the defendant may well have
falsely declared love for the plaintiff (in an effort to 'get off the
hook') and that he may have simply filmed the plaintiff for
entertainment.39 Thus it appears that the court did not consider
the alleged sexual attraction as necessary to the finding that the
defendant committed conduct of a sexual nature. This approach is
correct, as neither the Ordinance nor the relevant case law from
other jurisdictions requires a plaintiff to show that the harasser
acted out of sexual desire.40 What matters is the nature of the con-
duct itself. While filming a person is not, per se, a sexual act, 'conduct
of a sexual nature' should include secretly filming a woman while she
undresses. Society has long recognised the sexual connotations of
viewing a woman's body without her consent. For example, in crim-
inal law, the removal of a woman's clothing without consent (or
some other legal justification) constitutes an indecent assault and
therefore is classified as a sexual offence. This is true, regardless of
whether the defendant acted out of sexual desire, a desire to humili-
ate her, or simply a desire to steal her clothing.4 What is significant is
that 'right thinking people' would consider the act to be 'an affront to
the sexual modesty of a woman'.
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In the context of sexual harassment, courts in other jurisdictions
have also recognised that certain acts have inherent sexual connota-
tions, irrespective of the harasser's motive. Sending or displaying
graphic pornography to a woman;43 asking her explicit questions
about her sexual life;4 4 or making insulting sexual comments about
her body;45 all fall within the category of 'conduct of a sexual
nature'. Provided that the other elements of the definition are also
satisfied, such acts constitute sexual harassment, regardless of
whether the defendant sought sexual gratification. This is an impor-
tant principle, as harassers often do not act out of sexual desire but
rather out of a desire simply to hurt or humiliate the victim. For
example, in the UK case of Insitu Cleaning Co Ltd. v. Heads, the
defendant made insulting comments (such as 'Hiya, big tits') to the
plaintiff at work. The defendant was much younger than the plaintiff
and there was no indication that he was sexually attracted to her. The
defendant thus attempted to argue that his remarks were not 'sex
related', but rather were the equivalent of commenting upon a
man's balding head. The UK Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected
this argument, noting that 'a remark by a man about a woman's
breasts cannot sensibly be equated with a remark by a woman
about a bald head or a beard. One is sexual, the other is not.'4 6
Similarly, in Yuen Sha Sha, the secret filming of the plaintiff while
she undressed cannot sensibly be equated with other non-sexual
invasions of privacy (such as tapping one's telephone line). While
both activities are to be deplored, the former is sexual in nature, is
a clear affront to the plaintiff's sexual modesty, and is properly
addressed as a form of sexual harassment.
The reasonable person test: the final requirement is that a reason-
able person would have anticipated that the plaintiff would have
been offended, intimidated, or humiliated. This is often controversial
and there is an ongoing debate in the literature on the question of
how the hypothetical reasonable person should be defined.47 How-
ever, in this case, it is difficult to see how any reasonable person
(male or female) could fail to anticipate that the average woman
would be offended, humiliated (and very likely frightened) to dis-
cover that a man had been secretly filming her while she changed
her clothes in her bedroom. The one argument that the defendant
might have made is that a reasonable person would not have antici-
pated that the plaintiff would be offended or humiliated by the film-
ing because the expectation was that she would never find out about
it. On its face, this argument may seem reasonable, as one normally
cannot feel harassed without some awareness of the relevant con-
duct. However, a similar argument was rejected in the American
case of Liberti v. Walt Disney World,48 one of the few reported
decisions on secret videotaping as a form of sexual harassment. In
that case, a male employee had drilled holes in the walls of the
female dancers' dressing area and videotaped them in various
states of undress. The defendant argued (in a motion for summary
judgment) that the plaintiffs could not have perceived a hostile envir-
onment, as they were unaware of the videotaping until after it
stopped. The court rejected this argument and held that the plaintiffs'
after-the-fact knowledge could serve as the basis for their perception
that a hostile work environment existed. In my view, the same prin-
ciple should be applied to the reasonable person test in Yuen Sha Sha,
as the statute does not require that a reasonable person would antici-
pate that the plaintiff would feel offended, humiliated, or intimidated
while the acts were actually ongoing.
Yuen Sha Sha established an important precedent, one that has
already been relied upon by other women who were the targets of
voyeuristic behaviour.4 9 Unfortunately, the case also demonstrated
how difficult it is to litigate a claim for sexual harassment and how
meagre the compensation is likely to be. The plaintiff waited two
years for her remedy and was harassed further by the defendant while
the case was pending. During the trial she had to testify, relive the
harassment, and suffer the embarrassment of further press coverage.
At the end of this process, she obtained only HK$80,000 (about
US$10,000) in damages plus a court-ordered apology. Such a small
remedy may discourage others from litigating, particularly if they
have to pay their own legal expenses. This issue is explored further
in the next section of the article, on remedies and costs of litigation.
REMEDIES FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND COSTS OF
LITIGATION
Section 76 of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance sets forth the
remedies that may be awarded for sex discrimination and sexual
harassment. They can include: (i) damages (not only compensatory,
but also punitive or exemplary damages); (ii) a declaration that the
respondent has engaged in conduct that is unlawful, and that the
respondent shall not repeat or continue such unlawful conduct; (iii)
an order that the respondent employ or re-employ the complainant;
and/or (iv) an order that the respondent shall perform any reasonable
act or course of conduct to redress any loss or damage suffered by the
claimant.
As originally enacted in 1995, the Ordinance limited damages in
any one action to a maximum of HK$150,000 (less than US$20,000).
This limitation was not in the original Sex Discrimination Bill but
was added at the time of enactment by an amendment proposed by
a conservative legislator and supported by the government. How-
ever, the limitation was repealed (soon after the legislation came
into force) by an amendment bill proposed by legislator Christine
Loh. 50 Ms Loh's bill (which also added the order to employ or re-
employ the complainant to the list of available remedies) was
strongly opposed by the government and the business community.
Fortunately, her bill was voted on in June 1997, shortly before
China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong. On 1 July 1997,
China replaced the elected legislature with an appointed a Provi-
sional Legislative Council, which enacted a new election law and
re-instated the system of small elitist functional constituencies
(including corporate voting in some constituencies). This ensured
that the business community would once again dominate the
functional constituency seats, which make up 30 of the 60 seats in
the Legislative Council and have a constitutional right to veto any
bill that is not proposed by the government.51 Thus it would have
been almost impossible to enact Ms Loh's amendment bill after I
July 1997.
Of course, the repeal of the limitation on damages will not make
any difference unless Hong Kong judges are willing to make sub-
stantial damages awards. If a woman loses her job due to sexual
harassment, the court can calculate damages based upon lost
income. However, many sexual harassment cases (particularly
those arising in areas other than employment) do not involve large
economic losses but rather injury to feelings. In such cases, the
damages awarded will depend greatly on the court's approach to
assessing the impact of the harassment on the plaintiff. The initial
cases indicate that Hong Kong courts will be quite conservative in
their assessment of such damages.
For example, in the Yuen Sha Sha case (discussed above), the
plaintiff was a full-time student. She missed classes as a result of
the incident but still graduated with honours a few months later
and obtained a position as a teacher by the time of the trial. Thus
she did not claim any economic losses.52 Nonetheless, the incident
caused her great distress. The Judge summarised the plaintiff's
testimony as follows:
"... she was shocked, upset, distressed and literally trembling upon
discovery of the camcorder. After viewing the tape in the camcorder,
she was shaking and had to be supported by her friend ... the incident
had left her feeling violated, exploited, betrayed, humiliated and
hurt.... For sometime after the discovery, she was afraid to stay in
her hostel room, and for the month following she was unable to go
to sleep alone, and she did not attend class for 2 3 weeks. She felt
she was watched whenever she changed her clothes.'
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It is clear that the judge recognised that the plaintiff was not just
offended by the harassment. It left her in fear, caused her to lose
weight, and interfered with her quality of life for a significant
period of time. However, the judge assessed these damages at only
HK$50,000 (approximately US$6,250). In searching for comparable
cases, the judge referred to one case of racial discrimination but also
to several defamation cases. The rationale for considering defama-
tion cases was apparently the theory that the plaintiff's reputation
had been damaged. In my view this approach missed the real crux
of the plaintiff's claim. It also led the court to expressly devalue
the damages suffered by the plaintiff because she was 'a student
and not, at the time, a person enjoying a reputation in the com-
munity'.54 The social status of the plaintiff should not have been
considered relevant to the compensation she received for feelings
of violation, fear and other emotional pain.
The court did, however, also award exemplary and aggravated
damages (totalling $30,000) and this part of the judgement reflects
greater sensitivity to the feelings of the plaintiff and the violation
of her dignity.55 The court expressly found that the defendant's acts
were aggravated by his 'perverted lewdness' (demonstrated by the
care he took in directing the lens to the plaintiff's dressing area),
the fact that he filmed her over a period of months, showed the
tape to his friend, and caused friends to harass the plaintiff after
she filed her complaint.56 However, even with this additional sum
for exemplary damages, the plaintiff still received a total of only
HK$80,000 (approximately US$10,000).
It should be noted that low damage awards are particularly
problematic in Hong Kong because the legislation provides that
the court shall not normally award costs to the prevailing party.
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This rule (an exception to the normal principle in Hong Kong,
which is that 'costs follow the event') was adopted to allow a plaintiff
to sue without fear of being bankrupted by the defendant's legal
costs. However, it also means that a successful plaintiff will not
normally receive an order of costs and could actually lose money if
the judge does not award substantial damages. If the current trend
of small damage awards continues in Hong Kong victims of sexual
harassment will be unlikely to sue unless they fall within the fairly
small category of cases that receive free legal assistance from the
Equal Opportunities Commission (as did the plaintiff in Yuen Sha
Sha).
In addition to damages, plaintiffs often seek the remedy of a
court-ordered apology in harassment cases. In the Yuen Sha Sha
case the plaintiff requested a written apology and the Judge ordered
the defendant to provide it. The Judge relied upon section 76(3A)(b)
of the Ordinance, which provides for an 'order that the respondent
shall perform any reasonable act or course of conduct to redress
any loss or damage suffered by the claimant'. Similar language in
Australian legislation has been used extensively by Australian
courts and equal opportunities tribunals as the basis for orders to
apologise. However, in Hong Kong the legality of such orders has
been contested.
The debate on court-ordered apologies arose in the case of Ma
Bik Yung v. Ko Chuen,58 Hong Kong's first litigated case of disability
discrimination and harassment. The plaintiff, a paraplegic who had
been treated extremely badly by a taxi driver, was awarded
HK$20,000 in damages. The Court also ordered the defendant to
apologise for his conduct (relying upon language in the Disability
Discrimination Ordinance that is virtually identical to a remedies
provision in the Sex Discrimination Ordinance).59 However, the
defendant (who disputed the plaintiff's testimony and was
vehemently opposed to apologizing) appealed to the Court of
Appeal. The Court upheld the District Court's findings of fact and
the finding of disability harassment, but granted the appeal from
the finding of disability discrimination (for reasons not relevant
here). The Court of Appeal then also reduced the already small
damages award to $10,000 and granted the defendant's appeal
from the order to apologise. Interestingly, the Court of Appeal did
not strike down the order to apologise on the ground that it violated
the defendant's freedom of conscience and expression, which is the
strongest objection to court-ordered apologies. Rather, the Court
simply concluded, in a very brief decision, that an involuntary
apology would provide no redress to the plaintiff for disability
harassment and was therefore not within the scope of remedies
permitted under the Ordinance. This was a very strange conclusion,
given that the plaintiff herself had asked the court to order an
apology and was fully aware that the defendant would not provide
it voluntarily.
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Fortunately, the Equal Opportunities Commission assisted the
plaintiff to appeal this portion of the judgement. Although the
appeal was not successful for this particular plaintiff, the judgement
greatly improved the state of the law. The Court of Final Appeal
rejected the arguments that an involuntary apology would not
redress a plaintiff's injury and could never be a 'reasonable' order
under the terms of the Ordinance. However, the Court of Final
Appeal did give careful consideration to the free-speech concerns
that were not addressed in the Court of Appeal's judgement and
set a standard that makes it difficult to order a defendant to apologise
if he is vehemently opposed to doing so. In essence, the Court of
Final Appeal held that if an apology appears to be a reasonable
and appropriate remedy in the circumstances of the case, then the
trial court should first make a provisional order including the apology
(together with any other remedies, such as damages). However, if the
defendant then makes it clear that s/he is vehemently opposed to
apologizing, then the trial court should consider alternative reme-
dies, such as a 'substantial increase in the quantum of damages'.
6'
The Court of Final Appeal confirmed that the trial court does have
the power to issue a final order to apologise against an unwilling
defendant, but held that this should only be done in 'rare cases'
with exceptional circumstances, which it did not find in the case of
Ma Bik Yung.
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I am aware that some disability rights groups and also some
women's organizations were unhappy with the decision, as they
viewed orders to apologize as a very important remedy in the context
of disability and sexual harassment. An increase in the amount of
damages does not necessarily provide the same vindication as a
public apology. However, in my view, the Court of Final Appeal
was right to emphasize freedom of expression given that Hong
Kong is now a Special Administrative Region of China and many
people feel that freedom of expression is under threat. Of course, the
Court of Final Appeal's approach will not work at all unless Hong
Kong courts start ordering larger awards for injury to feelings. It
is encouraging that the Court of Final Appeal criticized the low
damages received by Miss Ma (although there was no appeal on
the quantum). The Court noted that the original award of $20,000
.was not a generous award' and that the Court of Appeal's decision
to halve it 'led to an award which is clearly on the low side, especially
as the order to apologise was quashed.'63 The Court of Final Appeal
also stressed that 'it is important for the court to bear in mind that
the remedies granted, including the quantum of damages, should
ensure respect for the legislation and its purpose.'64 Hopefully, this
language will encourage the courts to make more generous awards
in all discrimination and harassment cases.
CONCILIATION AND THE ROLE OF THE EQUAL
OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION
In the first year that the law was fully in force (1997), the Equal
Opportunities Commission received only 18 complaints of sexual
harassment. As the public became more aware of the law, the
number of complaints steadily increased. The Commission received:
54 sexual harassment complaints in 1998, 66 in 1999, 93 in 2000, 99 in
2001, 79 in 2002 and 131 in 2003. Indeed, sexual harassment com-
plaints generally make up the second-largest category of complaints
received by the Commission under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance
(surpassed only by complaints of pregnancy discrimination).65 Since
a very tiny percentage of these complaints proceed to court, one
cannot assess the impact of the law unless one examines the process
of investigation and conciliation at the Commission. Thus, as part of
a broader study on the enforcement of Hong Kong equal opportu-
nities laws, my research assistant and I interviewed officers from
the Commission, past complainants, and other individuals who
had assisted complainants and respondents in the complaints
process.
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We also analysed a random sample of complaint files, consisting
of all complaints concluded by the Commission over a nine-month
period.67 The total sample included 451 complaints filed under
three ordinances. 188 of these complaints were filed under the Sex
Discrimination Ordinance, of which 55 alleged sexual harassment.68
The table opposite shows the types of sexual harassment hat were
alleged in these 55 complaints.
The most commonly alleged behaviour was unwelcome oral
statements. Complaints that included this type of harassment
Type of harassment alleged in a random sample of 55 sexual harassment complaints
Type of sexual harassment N %
Unwelcome physical sexual advances 8 14.5
Unwelcome verbal sexual advances 1 1.8
Unwelcome requests for sexual favours 4 7.3
Unwelcome conduct of sexual nature (oral statements) 21 38.2
Unwelcome conduct of sexual nature (physical) 8 14.5
Unwelcome conduct of sexual nature (in written form) 3 5.5
Sexually hostile environment 8 14.5
Voyeuristic behaviour 1 1.8
Unwanted requests for dates 2 3.6
Employers' vicarious liability 16 29.1
Others 4 7.3
Total number of complaints 55
Note: The percentage column represents the percentage of complaints in the sample that included an
allegation of this type. As some complaints alleged more than one type of sexual harassment, the N
column totals to more than 55 and the % column totals to more than 100%.
generally alleged that the respondent had used sexually explicit or
offensive language. The next largest category was allegations based
upon the vicarious liability of an employer for harassment by
another employee. Our review of the complaint files showed that
very few of the employers named as respondents in our sample
had, at the time the discriminatory acts took place, a sexual harass-
ment and/or equal employment opportunity policy in place or a
person designated to handle such matters. Many complainants
claimed to have made an internal complaint before approaching
the Commission but said that their employer had taken no steps to
deal with the matter. Some complainants also alleged that they
were dismissed after they complained to their employers. It appears
that many of these employers were unaware of their potential
liability. This is consistent with a Commission survey of employees
and owner/operators of Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) and
of employees and employers of Medium to Large Enterprises
(MLE), which found that only 30% of SME employers and 34%
of MLE employers were aware that they could be held vicariously
liable for discriminatory acts carried out by their employees in the
workplace.69
Unwelcome physical sexual advances accounted for 8 of the
sexual harassment allegations in our sample. Examples of the
conduct alleged included leering and lewd gestures, unwelcome
touching, indecent assault and forced or coerced sexual relations.
Our sample also included eight additional allegations of unwelcome
physical conduct that was sexual in nature but did not amount to an
actual sexual advance. There were also eight allegations of a sexually
hostile environment, including obscene jokes around the workplace
and the display of sexist or other sexually offensive pictures.
In our sample, 18 of the 55 sexual harassment complaints (33%)
were discontinued. Most of these were discontinued because the
complainant herself decided not to pursue the complaint. In a few
cases, the Commission found the complaint to be lacking in
substance. We did not find any evidence that the Commission dis-
continues complaints lightly. We also noted that the discontinuation
rate for sexual harassment complaints was lower than the overall
discontinuation rate in our sample, which was 45%. (The disconti-
nuation rate was particularly high in complaints alleging disability
discrimination.)
In the first few years after it was established, the Commission
tended to investigate every complaint unless it was discontinued at
the intake stage. However, in 2001 after a six- month trial pro-
gramme, the Commission adopted a policy of encouraging 'early
conciliation', before the investigation stage. If the parties do not
agree to participate in early conciliation or fail to reach an agreement
then the complaint will be investigated. Assuming that the complaint
is not discontinued during or after the investigation stage the officer
will then suggest that the parties participate in post-investigation
conciliation. However, this does not necessarily mean that the two
parties sit down together and discuss the complaint. In many cases
(particularly those involving sexual harassment), the complainant
does not wish to meet the respondent. In such situations, the conci-
liation officer serves as a sort of messenger between the two parties
and the process becomes more like settlement negotiations than
what people might commonly think of as conciliation.
Thirty-seven of the 55 sexual harassment complaints in our
sample proceeded to some form of conciliation (either early concilia-
tion or post-investigation conciliation). Thirty of these complaints
were ultimately conciliated, while seven were deemed 'unsuccessful
conciliation', generating an overall conciliation rate of 55% for
sexual harassment complaints. This is significantly higher than the
overall conciliation rate for our total sample of 451 complaints,
which was only 35%. In the other main categories the conciliation
rates were: 37% (pregnancy discrimination), 40% (sex discrimina-
tion), and 26% (disability discrimination).7 °
It should be noted however, that the remedies obtained through
conciliation in the sexual harassment complaints were often fairly
meager and frequently did not include monetary compensation.
Based upon our sample, it appears that a significant number of com-
plainants alleging sexual harassment do not even ask for monetary
compensation as a remedy or they give up this request during the
negotiations. Instead, they obtain an apology, a promise to establish
a sexual harassment policy in the workplace, or a promise to prevent
harassment in the future. This may be one of the factors leading to
a higher conciliation rate in sexual harassment cases. It is fairly
painless for an employer to provide an apology, particularly if the
apology is given in very general terms and in a confidential setting.
It is also fairly easy to promise to establish a sexual harassment
policy, especially as the Commission does not follow up to see
whether the policy was implemented7' and the complainant herself
will often have left the company by this time.
In order to obtain a 'user's perspective' of the Commission's
complaints process, my research assistant and I also interviewed
several past complainants and representatives of organizations who
have assisted complainants. In this section of the article, I summarize
the comments that are most relevant to sexual harassment
complaints.72 It should be noted that while our sample of complaint
files was entirely random, the interviewees were not chosen
randomly. The past complainants we interviewed were largely
located though contacts with women's support groups and these
groups tend to be critical of the existing model. Nonetheless, we
were struck by the consistency of the interviewees' comments and I
believe that they do represent the experience of at least a significant
group of sexual harassment complainants. Some of our interviewees
from NGOs had assisted several complainants at the Commission
and they illustrated their opinions with specific examples.
We expected the interviewees to complain about the remedies
that are obtained in conciliation. However, only a few of the past
complainants brought up this point. They did say that they found
it very difficult to suggest a remedy and to calculate damages and
they wished that the Commission officers would offer more help in
this regard. A number of the interviewees also said that they pre-
ferred a detailed written apology to a monetary award. (This is
consistent with our review of the files, in which many complainants
did not ask for monetary compensation.) One interviewee who had
counseled a number of women in sexual harassment cases told us
that Hong Kong women find it very offensive to be asked by the
Commission officer to suggest an amount of monetary compensation
to the victim it seems as though she is being asked to sell her body
or her dignity to the respondent. When we discussed this point with
other NGO representatives, they agreed and added that they also
find it offensive to hear that a respondent has offered a victim of
sexual harassment a very small amount of money, often less than
Hong Kong $5,000 (about US $640). They feel that these respon-
dents are just insulting the complainant again, by suggesting that
they can easily buy the right to touch or speak to her in an sexual
manner. Our interviewees also noted (and our review of the files in
our sample confirmed) that some of the 'apologies' obtained in
conciliation are extremely vague. For many complainants, it is
important that the respondent acknowledge that what he did consti-
tuted sexual harassment. However, respondents are often unwilling
to do this (even though they cannot be sued once the complaint is
conciliated) and will only agree to give a very general apology.
However, most of the negative comments from our interviewees
concerned the process of investigation and conciliation rather than
the actual settlement terms. Virtually all of our interviewees from
the complainants' side commented that the Commission's role
in the process is much different to what they had expected. Since
the Commission was given a statutory power to investigate com-
plaints, they had initially assumed that the officer would approach
a complaint in much the same way that a police officer would inves-
tigate a complaint under the criminal law. They had expected the offi-
cer to actively gather evidence, contact and interview witnesses, and
draft witness statements - all with the purpose of building a case
against the respondent. As one woman who had filed a complaint
of sexual harassment commented: 'I thought the Commission was
an organization similar to the Police. I was the victim in this incident
and was humiliated and treated unfairly. I thought when I lodged a
complaint to the Commission they would investigate and prosecute
the offender.' These women were surprised to find that the officer
expected the complainant to provide so much in the way of infor-
mation, documents, and witnesses. The interviewees described the
officers as 'passive' and said that officers could do much more to
investigate the complaint. Some past-complainants offered a different
view, describing the officer in their case as helpful and hard-working.
However, even those interviewees were disappointed at how little
power the officer had. They claimed that the respondents would stall
for time during the investigation stage and did not seem afraid of
the officer's threats.
Virtually all the interviewees also commented negatively on the
neutrality of the complaints officers (our interviewees generally used
the term 'neutral' rather than 'impartial'). The officer can assist the
complainant to draft her complaint letter but otherwise must be
impartial towards the complaint. This duty of impartiality has
proved extremely controversial among complainants and women's
organizations, as they had expected the Commission to play more
of an advocacy role. Our interviewees reported that the officers
frequently mentioned their duty to be neutral. For example, a
number of our interviewees described how the respondent would
send very complicated letters, setting forth legal arguments against
the complaint. The complainants are often baffled by these letters
and have no idea what to say when asked to respond. According
to our interviewees, if a complainant asks for help in digesting or
responding to a letter from the respondent's lawyer, the officer is
unlikely to give much advice, citing the duty of neutrality. My inter-
views with the officers themselves also indicate that they are very
concerned about being accused of bias. Several officers mentioned
that respondents will complain if the officer appears to be advising
the complainant, arguing on her behalf, or suggesting that a settle-
ment offer is on the low side.
Of course, from the point of view of our interviewees, a neutral
officer simply does not fulfil the original mission of the Commission.
Most complaints arise from an employment dispute and the com-
plainant typically has to conciliate with a person who has far more
socio-economic power than the complainant. If the respondent is
an individual he was probably her boss or occupied a superior
rank in the company. If the respondent is her employer (named by
virtue of its vicarious liability) then it will be represented in the
conference by a lawyer, a human resource expert, or some other
managerial level employee. The complainant may be accompanied
by a friend or a representative of a women's organization or a
trade union. However, the extent to which this can address the
power imbalance depends upon the relative expertise of the person
accompanying the complainant when compared to that of the
respondent. Although some of the NGO representatives that we
interviewed were clearly very experienced and knowledgeable, they
are not trained lawyers and cannot be expected to advise a com-
plainant if the respondent makes complicated legal arguments.
These organizations also operate on limited budgets and with limited
staff.
Our interviewees also reported that the complainant generally
can only bring a friend or NGO representative into the conciliation
conference if the respondent also sends two people or gives permis-
sion for the complainant to have an extra person on her side of the
table. Even then, our interviewees claimed that the supporter could
not speak during the conference without permission. One representa-
tive of a women's group described how she had to sit outside the con-
ciliation room, although the complainant, who had alleged sexual
harassment, was clearly in distress and was actually in tears at the
thought of going into the room on her own. The respondent would
not give permission for her supporter to enter the room, taking the
position that it would be 'unbalanced' because the respondent had
only sent one person.
While on the face of it these rules may seem fair, they reflect a
very literal understanding of what 'balanced' means and do not
take into account the imbalance of power that often exists between
the two parties. If the one person that the respondent sends is a
lawyer or a highly experienced human resource manager, then a
former clerical worker will clearly be at a disadvantage if she is on
her own. The complainant may also be suffering emotionally from
the harassment that led to the complaint. The past complainants
who we interviewed frequently mentioned the emotional pain they
suffered as a result of the harassment and the resulting dispute
with their employer or former employer. They also talked at length
about the stress and anxiety that they suffered during the investiga-
tion stage and noted that the Commission officers were not equipped
to deal with emotional distress. A representative of a support group
for victims of sexual violence told us that the Commission officers
now regularly refer victims of sexual harassment o her for counsel-
ing, which is certainly a good thing. However, she also commented
that the complaints process inevitably works 'to increase the com-
plainant's suffering', as the complainant is required to relive the
experience at every stage. Under these circumstances, it is important
that the complainant always be permitted to bring her supporter into
the conciliation conference - especially since the Commission's con-
ciliation officers feel obligated to play a strictly neutral role in the
conference.
Several of our interviewees also expressed isappointment at the
fact that conciliation does not include a judgment by the Commis-
sion or by some other body. Many interviewees commented that
complainants in sexual harassment cases come to the Commission
in search of 'justice' and they are disappointed to find that no author-
itative body will 'rule' on their complaint. As one representative of a
women's group commented, 'why should the complainant answer all
these questions and produce all the evidence if the result of the inves-
tigation is just a conciliation conference where the respondent can
refuse to admit to anything?' Many of our interviewees said that
they wanted the respondent to be prevented from committing the
same act again and that they feared that a confidential settlement
would not have that effect.
Confidential settlements also do little to raise public awareness
of the problem of sexual harassment. The Commission does publish
the results of some noteworthy conciliated cases in its Newsletter and
in a new on-line settlement register, but always with the names and
details changed to preserve confidentiality. Clearly these summaries
do not generate nearly as much public attention as an actual court
case. Moreover, one of our interviewees (an NGO representative
who has assisted a number of women in sexual harassment com-
plaints) argued that a settlement register without names actually
sends out the wrong message - that a respondent can 'buy his way
out' of a complaint for a fairly small sum of money and no
damage to his reputation.
It is often assumed that Hong Kong victims of sexual harass-
ment would be too embarrassed to litigate their complaints. Our
interviews with officers at the Commission confirm that a significant
percentage of victims do value the confidential nature of conciliation
and would not be willing to litigate their claims in a public forum,
even if legal assistance were provided. However, many of the past
complainants that we interviewed stated that they would be willing
to litigate if they could afford to do so or were given legal assistance.
Some of them expressly stated that they would prefer this to what
they consider to be the greater indignity of being asked to negotiate
with the person who harassed them. A representative of an
organization that regularly assists sexual harassment complainants
commented as follows:
"Some complainants do not want to conciliate with the respondent,
especially in the sexual harassment cases. They lodge the complaint
not because of wanting the respondent's money. They want to put
the case to court. They want society to know what the respondent
has done. In fact, when complainants come to lodge the complaints,
they are prepared to expose their cases. But in the current complaint
procedure, complainants are not given a choice. They are only
asked to go for conciliation and set an amount of monetary compen-
sation. It actually hurts their feelings."
An individual complainant who had alleged sexual harassment
in employment expressed similar views. Her comments were particu-
larly striking because her complaint was successfully conciliated and
she received substantial monetary compensation (significantly more
than the plaintiff received in the litigated case discussed earlier in
this article). Nonetheless, she was bitter about the overall experience.
She claimed that she felt 'pushed to settle the case by the conciliation
officer and also by [the respondent's] lawyer'. She also recalled how
angry she was to find that conciliation was the next step after the
lengthy investigation and she felt that it was a 'waste of time to
make all the effort to find the evidence in the investigation period.'
In fact, her efforts almost certainly were not wasted because the
evidence she put forward probably helped to persuade the lawyer
to recommend a substantial settlement offer and her compensation
was well above the average in conciliated complaints. However,
from the complainant's perspective, the process felt like a waste of
time because there was no judgment at the end and little sense of
vindication.
Of course, if the conciliation does not lead to an agreement hen
the complainants will be even more disappointed with the process.
Even if the evidence is strong the Commission cannot compel the
respondent to participate in conciliation or to make a reasonable
offer. One past complainant told us that she filed a complaint
together with several other women, all alleging that they had been
harassed by the same supervisor in their office. They brought com-
plaints against both the supervisor and the company. The interviewee
told us that the company offered some compensation and also agreed
to establish a sexual harassment policy. However, she claimed that
the individual respondent was very skillful at delaying the process,
refusing to reply to the Commission and not showing up for concilia-
tion meetings. She told us that at the end of a very long process he
offered a small amount of money to each complainant and that all
but one of the complainants refused his offer because they felt
insulted by the low amount and by his dismissive attitude. They
felt that the process had done nothing to change his behaviour or
his attitudes toward women.
One of the points brought out in these interviews is the differ-
ence in the bargaining positions of the two parties, which is exacer-
bated by the uncertainty of obtaining legal assistance. Both parties
know that if conciliation fails then the complainant must either
abandon the claim or commence an action in the District Court.
The complainant can apply for legal assistance but the Commission
is not obligated to provide it (and the government's Legal Aid
Department is unlikely to aid a complainant under the three anti-
discrimination ordinances). In fact, a brochure given to both parties
states that legal assistance generally will be granted only if the case
'raises a question of principle; or it is unreasonable, because of the
complexity of the case or the applicant's position in relation to the
respondent, to expect the applicant to deal with the case unaided'.
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the respondent she is running a risk of obtaining no remedy at all,
despite the effort she has put into the process. She is therefore
under some pressure to accept any offer. The conciliation officer
may also subtly suggest that she accept the offer, not only to increase
the officer's conciliation rate but also because the officer will feel
badly if the complainant walks away with nothing. In contrast, the
respondent is in exactly the opposite position. The respondent can
offer a very low remedy, knowing that the complainant almost
certainly cannot afford to sue without first applying for legal assis-
tance. If the complainant accepts the low offer then the complaint
is resolved. If the complainant rejects the offer and later obtains
legal assistance, the respondent can offer to settle the case at that
point and still avoid a public trial.
At the conclusion of interviews, we asked our interviewees
whether they would support the establishment of an informal
equal opportunities tribunal. The interviewees from the complain-
ants' side generally supported establishing a tribunal, provided that
it was inexpensive, reasonably informal, and staffed by members
with gender awareness and expertise in the field. It was important
to them that complainants be allowed to file a complaint directly
in a tribunal, without first participating in mandatory conciliation.
As a matter of principle, they felt that complainants should always
be given the choice as to whether to participate in pre-hearing conci-
liation. They also noted that a long process of investigation and con-
ciliation 'wears people down' and that some complainants might lose
their energy and never go to the tribunal if they were forced to go
through conciliation first. Of course, even if conciliation were not
required the respondent could still offer to settle the case before
the tribunal hearing and in practice many complainants might
agree to settle if the terms were reasonable. Most of our interviewees
also thought that the existence of a tribunal would make conciliation
and pre-hearing settlement discussions more productive. They felt
that respondents would have a greater incentive to conciliate the
case if they knew that the complainant could go to a tribunal, with
or without legal assistance from the Commission.
It should be noted, however, that some of the comments made
by past complainants during our interviews do reflect a lack of
understanding of the alternatives to the current model. For example,
some interviewees aid they would prefer litigation in court because it
would be quicker than investigation and conciliation. This is almost
certainly not the case, since litigation is generally extremely slow,
although an informal tribunal should work faster than formal
litigation in the District Court. It is also likely that some of our
interviewees do not fully appreciate how stressful a trial or a hearing
before a tribunal could be. Moreover, anyone who is employed (or
hopes to be employed) may have second thoughts about a public
hearing since Hong Kong is a small territory and employers are
loath to hire anyone who has sued their employer in the past.
Thus, I have no doubt that a certain percentage of complainants
would continue to choose the confidential conciliation process even
if a tribunal were created. However, the interviews reveal that a
significant percentage of people would like to have the option to
go directly to a hearing. Under the current system the complainant
feels that she is being forced to compromise on her principles because
she does not have the money to litigate on her own and because the
Commission will not even consider her application for legal
assistance unless she has already made a good faith effort to
conciliate. This is not the fault of the Commission as it is only
following its statutory duty to attempt conciliation. But the result
is that a significant group of complainants and activists feel
disempowered by the very organization that was supposed to
empower them.
Of course, the views expressed by the past complainants and
women's support groups arguably express a one-sided view of the
process. Unfortunately, we were only able to locate one individual
respondent in a sexual harassment case who was willing to be inter-
viewed about his experiences with the Commission's complaints
procedures. He maintained that the allegations against him were
entirely false and that the complainant was trying to get revenge
against him for giving her a low grade in a performance appraisal.
He also described the Commission's investigation process as very
stressful and burdensome, saying that he was afraid to open the
mail for fear that he would find another letter from the Commission
asking him more questions. He told us that the stress became so great
that his company referred him to a counselor and a member of his
family introduced him to a friend who was a lawyer. Interestingly,
this respondent recalled that: 'my lawyer said to me that I could
ignore the Commission because it could not do much'. In the end
he must not have felt too intimidated by the Commission, or else
he felt very sure of his position, because he refused to conciliate
the complaint. However, there is no question that the complaint
did cause him considerable emotional distress. This is worth bearing
in mind, particularly when considering the complainants' argument
that the conciliation officer should assist the complainant in a
more active manner.
Most of our interviewees from the respondents' perspective were
not individual respondents but people who had represented their
employer or their client at the Commission. A few were lawyers
but most were human resource managers or other managerial-level
employees of the respondent. All of the respondents' representatives
that we interviewed were confident, articulate, and quite knowledge-
able about the law, particularly as it affected their work. In general,
the respondents' representatives were far more positive about the
role of the Commission and the approach taken by officers than
our interviewees on the complainants' side. Several of the inter-
viewees from the respondents' side described the officers as playing
a proactive role in the resolution of complaints, particularly during
the conciliation conferences.
At first, it seems perplexing that the respondents' representatives
view the Commission officers as being proactive while the com-
plainants and their representatives view them as being so passive.
However, this may be explained by the very different desires and
expectations of the two groups. As demonstrated by our interviews,
many complainants resent what is effectively, for them, a duty to
participate in conciliation and they would not necessarily view
active encouragement to conciliate as a positive thing. Complainants
also expect the officers to be on their side and are disappointed when
the officer insists upon playing a neutral role. In contrast, it was clear
from our interviews with respondents' representatives that they had
never expected the Commission officer to assist them and they were
pleased to find that the officers were impartial and not biased against
them.
Virtually all of the interviewees from the respondents' side said
that they would probably oppose the creation of an equal opportu-
nities tribunal. When asked why, one interviewee (a representative
of a university) noted that conciliation offers the respondent a
chance to learn from the experience, without the hostility of litiga-
tion. She felt that she and other senior administrators had learned
a good deal from attending a conciliation conference and listening
to a student describe her dissatisfaction with the complaints
procedure at her university. However, most of the interviewees
said that they would oppose the creation of a tribunal simply because
it would make it too easy for complainants to bring weak cases to a
hearing, wasting time and damaging the reputation of the respon-
dent. In general, our interviewees from the respondents' side felt
that a large percentage of complaints made under the three ordi-
nances are weak and that respondents only conciliate them in
order to save time. Some of the interviewees commented that
sexual harassment complainants, in particular, often amount to
nothing more than 'trivial comments' to which the complainant
has over-reacted. Of course, this gap in perceptions is not confined
to Hong Kong. The law and practice of sexual harassment is full
of examples in which the complainant's and the respondent's
view of what a 'reasonable person' would find offensive are hugely
different.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD
The results of our interviews and review of the case files were
presented at a conference in Hong Kong in 2003, which a number
of officers from the Commission attended.74 To its credit, the Com-
mission has already taken some steps to address concerns expressed
by past-complainants and representatives of women's support
groups. In particular, the Commission developed its on-line settle-
ment register in 2003, which is designed to provide more trans-
parency and publicity for the conciliated cases. Anna Wu, the
Chairperson of the Commission at the time of the conference, also
stated that she hoped to provide more training to outside advocates
(representatives of trade unions and women's support groups) and to
encourage more private lawyers to offer pro-bono legal services for
meritorious cases.
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The Commission is also studying the concept of an informal
tribunal (or a simplified procedure in the District Court) in order
to allow more complainants in equal opportunities cases to
commence litigation on their own. The Commission itself cannot
establish such a tribunal but it is actively studying the options, in
order to make an informed recommendation to the government.
There are many issues to consider, including whether to allow legal
representation and whether tribunal hearings should be open to
the public. More complainants would be willing to file complaints
with a tribunal if their privacy could be preserved. The business com-
munity may also prefer confidential proceedings and its support is
generally essential to any legislative proposals. However, public
hearings would certainly do more to raise awareness of discrimina-
tion and harassment, which is a major concern of women's organiza-
tions and also the disability rights movement. The government has
also now agreed to introduce a race discrimination bill (probably
in 2005) and it will likely follow whatever enforcement model is
used for the existing anti-discrimination ordinances. Thus, groups
that are active in the racial equality movement should also be con-
sulted on the procedures for any new tribunal.
Despite the difficulties in enforcement that have been identified
in this article, there is no question in my mind that the sexual harass-
ment provisions of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance have had a
positive impact in Hong Kong. The existence of the legislation,
backed up by the Commission's services, has encouraged women
to come forward with complaints. It has also led numerous compa-
nies, universities, and other institutions to adopt and enforce explicit
policies against sexual harassment - something that never would
have occurred had it not been for the fear of vicarious liability. In
some cases, administrators have been criticized for their initial
ineptitude (or unwillingness) to effectively enforce these policies.
For example, my own institution, the University of Hong Kong,
received severe criticism from students and staff for the way that it
addressed the well-publicized 'email case'.76 However, the University
responded by agreeing to review the procedures and by appointing a
full-time Equal Opportunities Officer - something that students and
staff had long lobbied for but was previously considered an unneces-
sary expense. The Equal Opportunities Officer now regularly con-
ducts training sessions for staff who are designated to receive
complaints in each department. There is also a good deal of promo-
tional and educational material on campus on sexual harassment. I
now regularly receive inquiries from students and staff about
behaviour that they believe might contravene the Ordinance or the
University's sexual harassment policy. These developments tell me
that the community is becoming less tolerant of sexual harassment
and more willing to take a stand against it. The Sex Discrimination
Ordinance and the Equal Opportunities Commission are playing
an important role in that process.
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